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Abstract: This paper explores how political struggles influence innovation policy through a 
Norwegian case study on the formation of a state-funded research and development program 
for utilizing natural gas feedstock from the North Sea. Despite the apparent dominance of 
business, specialized branches of the state, and R&D institutions in the realm of innovation 
policy,  the  key  argument  of  this  paper  is  that  labor  unions  and  regional  interests  exert 
considerable influence in shaping national innovation policy, in particular when reflexively 
exploiting  new  forms  of  state  accumulation  strategies  while  retaining  a  defensive  stance 
against deindustrialization. First, we argue that the struggle for state funding to natural-gas-
based R&D was particularly effective because appropriate strategic political networks and 
alliances were mobilized. Second, the construction of strategic arguments to accommodate 
the social corporatist heritage of state intervention on the one hand and the competition-
oriented language of flexible specialization on the other, proved crucial for acceptance as a 
state  strategy.  The  paper  engages  a  Strategic–  Relational  Approach  to  state  theory  and 
argues that this is a useful starting point when studying how particular contexts affect how 
and why certain innovation policies emerge. In doing so, we also address the lack of political 
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1. Introduction 
While several contributions within the field of innovation studies ask for policies that embrace 
the interests and abilities of labor and less favored regions  (Guth, 2005; Lundvall, 2002; 
Lundvall  and  Lorenz,  2006;  Rutherford  and  Holmes,  2007;  Schienstock,  2001),  the 
institutional and political preconditions and processes behind such innovation policies have 
rarely been studied (Edquist, 2001; Lundvall et al, 2002). This paper explores how political 
strategies by organized interests confront the competing institutional structures of traditional 
social corporatism (Katzenstein, 1985) and emergent competition state logics (Jessop, 2002) 
in  innovation  policy  construction.  This  is  illustrated  by  a  Norwegian  case  study  of  the 
formation of a national R&D program for the industrial utilization of natural gas. Inspired by 
the Strategic–Relational Approach (Jessop, 2007), we focus on how the Norwegian state is the 
target as well as the arena for the shifting power struggle between social groups that seek to 
influence innovation policy and natural resource management. In particular, we highlight how 
spatio–temporal contingency and the rescaling of state power affect this balance of forces. We 
thus  suggest  an  approach  to  innovation  policy  where  labor  and  regions  with  claims  for 
equalizing and balancing state policies (Brenner, 2004, page 106) have a stronger influence. 
This  Keynesian  tendency  has  been  challenged  in  recent  years,  and  the  Norwegian  state 
accumulation  strategy  has  seemed  to  move  in  the  direction  of  competition  state  logics, 
(Amdam and Bukve, 2004) where also a decline of corporatist influences on industrial policy 
(Reitan et al., 2008) has been noticable. As such, we juxtapose two ideal types of strategic 
selectivity for innovation policy through which political strategy is mediated.. 
It  is  relevant  to  highlight  the  particular  scope  of  natural  resource  governance 
(Perreault,  2006).  To  date,  Norway  exports  almost  99  percent  of  its  natural  gas  overseas 
(NPD, 2007), mainly because of a combination of cheap domestic hydroelectric power and 
the existence of a mature market for natural gas on the European continent and in the UK at   3 
the  time  of  discovery  in  the  late  1960s  (Nerheim  and  Dahlberg,  1996).  Path-dependent 
infrastructure patterns have thus impeded efforts to increase domestic use despite overt state 
strategies  for  increasing  domestic  industrial  activity  related  to  the  country’s  petroleum 
resources  (Cappelen  and  Mjøset,  2009).  Moreover,  political–economic  regulation  through 
membership  in  the  European  Economic  Area  and  state-controlled  petroleum  companies’ 
concerns  for  shareholders  (Engen,  2009)  make  grand  state  investments  to  create  a  larger 
Norwegian market for natural gas less likely. We argue that innovation policy represents a 
different kind of opportunity for embedding natural resources in domestic space, creating a 
revitalization and renewal of natural resource claims. 
The  next  section  provides  the  theoretical  background.  We  turn  to  the  strategic–
relational  approach  as  a  framework  for  understanding  the  struggles  and  selectivities  of 
resource-based innovation policy. We pay specific attention to how  political strategies of 
labor unions and regional interests are moderated by contrasting contexts for state selectivity. 
Hay’s  (1998)  categories  of  strategic  networking  and  strategic  formulation  are  engaged  as 
operational tools for exploring aspects of structure–agency and spatio–temporal contingency 
that  are  all  related  to  the  strategic–relational  approach.  Following  an  account  of  the 
Norwegian legacy of resource-oriented industrial policy in section 3, section 4 first discusses 
the emergence of strategic networks that actively initiated and shaped the large “Gassmaks” 
Research Program. Then, we demonstrate how the research program was promoted through 
strategic  argumentation.  This  is  analyzed  with  reference  to  the  contrasting  ideal  types  of 
strategic selectivity. In our conclusion, we touch upon possible policy failures associated with 
this kind of politics of innovation and set it against other national experiences. The study is 
based  on  20  semistructured  interviews  with  involved  policy  actors  in  addition  to  key 
documents and attendance at meetings and conferences. 
   4 
2. Theoretical background 
Edquist  (2001,  page  18)  defines  innovation  policy  as  “[…]  public  action  that  influences 
technical  change  and  other  kinds  of  innovations.  It  includes  elements  of  research  and 
development  (R&D)  policy,  technology  policy,  infrastructure  policy,  regional  policy  and 
education  policy”.  Smits  and  Kuhlmann  (2004)  point  to  three  general  tendencies  in  the 
innovation policy  literature. First, it emphasizes a departure from the linear model and its 
precept  of  automatic  transfers  of  scientific  discoveries  to  innovation  in  firms.  Second,  in 
contrast  to  the  linear  model,  the  systemic  perspective  directs  policy  analysis  towards  the 
institutional  context  of  innovation.  Third,  by  adopting  institutional  analysis  instead  of 
neoclassical  ideas  of  optimization  as  the  basis  for  policy  advice,  interventions  to  reduce 
uncertainty and encourage experimentation and learning are often recommended. 
While  early  contributions  in  the  field  focused  on  national  systems  of  innovation 
(Lundvall,  1992),  later  contributions  emphasized  the  increasingly  multiscalar  character  of 
innovation  systems.  (Cooke  et  al.,  2000;  Doloreux  and  Parto,  2005;  Kuhlmann,  2001; 
Tödtling and Trippl, 2005). However, while discussions about the increasingly multiscalar 
nature of innovation processes (Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Bunnell and Coe, 2001) that often 
question  the  capacities  (Grande,  2001)  for  nationally  and  regionally  based  innovation 
strategies have emerged, there have been few attempts at understanding the political struggles 
surrounding innovation strategies. In this respect, the literature on innovation policy rarely 
mentions contributions that highlight inherent sociospatial tensions (Brenner, 2004; Jones, 
2001;  Swyngedouw,  1997)  or  political  strategies  (Hay,  1998,  2004).  Przeworski  (2004) 
addresses similar shortcomings in much contemporary institutional analysis. Edquist (2001) 
also highlights this weakness when he admits that the innovation literature does not provide 
an analysis of the role of the state.   5 
Exceptions do exist. Lundvall (2002) focuses on how less autonomy for workers and 
greater  job  insecurity  may  undermine  learning.  Schienstock  (2001)  criticizes  the  learning 
economy for having socially exclusionary effects, implicitly linking a focus on innovation to 
increasing power differentials between employers and employees. Guth (2005) calls for more 
socially inclusive and participative forms of regional associative governance (as in Cooke et 
al, 2000) to counteract territorial and social imbalances within the EU. 
 
The strategic relational approach and the politics of innovation 
We argue that a useful way of approaching the politics of innovation is through the strategic–
relational approach (SRA) (Jessop, 2007). Although conceived as a broad approach to social 
theory,  the  perspective  has  been  applied  to  the  study  of  state–economy  relations,  most 
famously by Jessop (2002) when analyzing the transition from a Keynesian Welfare State to a 
Schumpeterian Workfare State Inspired by Poulantzas (1978), SRA entails a specific way of 
seeing the state, state institutions and all those agents involved in the different priorities of the 
state as a social relation. More specifically: “[…] the strategic–relational state approach […] 
implies that the exercise of state power… involves a form-determined condensation of the 
changing balance of (social) forces.” (Jessop, 2002, page 40). Jessop pays specific attention to 
the gap in the innovation literature identified above, namely by analyzing how state policies 
are actively shaped by and reproduced through particular political strategies and how the 
power balance between different forces affects particular outcomes. This is an important point 
in our paper as we argue that innovation policy should not be seen as predetermined by the 
interests of business alone, but rather as an expression of the intersection of social forces at a 
specific spatial–temporal junction. 
The  question  of  structure  and  agency  in  the  SRA  is  dynamic  and  aims  to  “[…] 
examine  structure  in  relation  to  action  and  action  in  relation  to  structure,  rather  than   6 
bracketing one of them” (Jessop, 2001, page 1223), thus aiming to go beyond the duality of 
structure–agency in Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory. Even if the state could be seen as 
more receptive to some interests over others, it does not automatically mean that selectivity is 
chosen regardless of how these interests are pursued. Rather, the priorities of the state are 
strategic (Jessop, 2007) in that they encompass the strategies of a multitude of actors and 
interests,  some  more  persuasive  than  others.  Strategic  selectivity  is  a  key  concept  when 
attempting to grasp this relational approach to structure and agency, involving “[…] the ways 
in which the state […] has a specific, differential impact on the ability of various political 
forces  to  pursue  particular  interests  and  strategies  in  specific  spatial–temporal  contexts” 
(Jessop,  2002,  page  40).  The  emergence  of  a  particular  strategic  selectivity  is  indeed  a 
structural constraint to agency. These may form into selectivities that are relatively stable—
giving the impression of a certain “[…] unity of state power” (Poulantzas, 1978, page 136). 
As  a  replacement  for  the  “unity”  of  the  “Keynesian  welfare  state”,  the  idea  of  a 
“Schumpeterian  Competition  State”  (Jessop,  2002,  page  95)  implies  a  conception  of  new 
forms of state governance that cater for more flexible and competition-based accumulation. 
This kind of selectivity has tended to privilege the needs of business at the expense of actors 
arguing in favor of social and spatial redistribution (Painter and Goodwin, 2000). Brenner 
(2004) discusses how spatial redistribution schemes during the reign of the Keynesian welfare 
state have become largely replaced by and rescaled to regional and metropolitan competition-
oriented entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, SRA reminds us that despite emergent hegemonies, 
there  are  great  spatial–temporal  differences  as  to  how  the  balance  of  social  forces  is 
distributed. Scharpf and Schmidt (2000) argue that institutional and discursive traits from the 
Keynesian era often balance the imperatives of the international neoliberal order, offering 
”counter-hegemonic discourses and practices” (Lagendijk, 2007, page 1197). The Variety of 
Capitalism  stream  similarly  reminds  us  of  the  historical  and  geographical  contingencies   7 
affecting state selectivity to economic policy, not least in including labor interests (Thelen, 
2001). 
The concept of discourse has emerged as integral to SRA. Jessop (2007) recognizes 
Hay’s (e.g. 1998) early contribution in highlighting that the distinction between the discursive 
elements and the materiality of state selectivities is blurred and that attention to the power of 
discourse is needed, echoing Foucault’s governmentality (Jessop, 2007). The use of discourse 
within SRA was, however, limited until Sum and Jessop (2008) elaborated their SRA-based 
approach Cultural Political Economy (Jessop, 2007, page 15). Here, the state is not only a 
compromise between class and interest fractions, but also a strong bearer of discourses that 
carry  with  them  specific  state  selectivities  that  permeate  state  institutions.  This  is  also 
reflected in institutional theory, which highlights the role of norms that are embedded in 
particular spatial–temporal contexts (Schmidt, 2002) as we will return to below. 
 
Political agency and the SRA 
Since we highlight the agency of labor in influencing innovation policy in this paper, it is 
relevant to draw upon some of the existing insights about this relationship. Rutherford and 
Holmes (2007) indeed stress the importance of labor agency in shaping industrial policy and 
strategy. It is also important to note that the preconditions for labor agency have changed 
dramatically following the shift in state selectivity towards “workfarism” (Peck, 2001). Tufts 
(2008, page 1) notes that unions have altered their strategies according to these shifts through 
what he terms “Schumpeterian unionism”. This kind of unionism directs strategies to the 
global and regional scale rather than the traditional level of the national scale because of the 
rescaling of economic activities and regulation. He also claims that unions adopt innovation 
and flexible specialization into their vocabulary to retain worker influence. While one can 
argue that the flexible workfare regimes undermine those worker rights that were patiently   8 
constructed in the postwar period (Peck, 2001), the reflexive exploitation of opportunities that 
exist within the parameters of flexible specialization may imply labor union influence. 
In order to explore how agency is reflected in our case study, we have engaged Hay’s 
(1998) models of strategic networks and strategic formulation within the SRA framework. 
We  find  these  categories  useful  tools  for  analysis  as  they  reflect  the  agency  of  building 
alliances discussed above, as well as the importance of discursively embedding strategy in 
hegemonic  or  competing  strategically  selective  contexts.  Networks  can  be  understood  as 
“[the]  reflexive  self-organization  of  independent  [public  and  private]  actors  involved  in 
complex relations of reciprocal interdependence […]” (Jessop, 2002, page 152). Further, the 
implications  of  network  cooperation  can  be  seen  as  transcending  the  mere  exchange  of 
resources. Norms and the development of common understandings may also contribute to 
stronger network commitment and reflexive strategic learning (Ansell, 2000). Hay (1998) 
contends that a “network hegemony” often takes charge in defining important strategies and 
alliances (see figure 1). Moreover, the choice of partners in a strategic network may also 
change according to a flux in strategic state selectivity. The formation and governance of 
strategic  networks  aiming  to  influence,  in  this  case,  innovation  policy,  can  be  expressed 
through Hay’s network model:   9 
 
Figure 1. Strategic networks (based on Hay, 1998, page 46) 
 
Figure 1 does not reflect the fact that the actors may not be disparate at all, but rather 
that they have joint interests that have not been realized because of insufficient interaction. 
Long-standing  norms  and  mechanisms  that  have  enabled  cooperation  between  and  within 
organizations  in  the  past,  can  be  seen  as  key  factors  for  realizing  successful  networking 
(Ansell, 2000). Nevertheless, this structuring element has to be complemented by the creative 
configuration  of  each  particular  network,  as  Hay  (1998)  asserts.  The  role  of  the  network 
hegemony is of particular interest, as power can be about the ability to influence the actions of 
others and to master systems of shared meaning (Giddens, 1984), demonstrating an interactive 
or networked understanding of power (Allen, 2003) that highlights creative configurations of 
society’s mobilizing forces. 
Hay’s  model  for  strategic  formulation  (Hay,  1998,  page  143)  demonstrates  the 
structured  agency  (Jessop,  2001)  in  maneuvering  in  and  between  discursive  strategically 
Disparate actors and 
organizations 
Disparate actors and 
organizations 
Recognition and 
establishment of common 
agenda.  
Recruitment of strategic 
partners, often under the 
dominance of an emergent 
network hegemon 
Networking: creating codes 
of conduct, strategising, 
altering strategies to a 
changing context   10 
selective contexts (see figure 2). In our modified version, we particularly highlight the role of 
argumentation for reaching policy legitimacy (Schmidt, 2002). 
 
Figure 2. Strategic formulation (based on Hay, 1998, page 43 and Jessop, 2001, page 1224) 
 
It is necessary to elaborate on what we mean by enhanced legitimacy in political strategy. 
Schmidt (2002) emphasizes that spatial–temporal contingencies are crucial for understanding 
how economic policy areas such as innovation are politicized and legitimized. She argues 
that, in order to gain political thrust, strategic actors have to adopt hegemonic discourses in 
various scales and spheres. She first singles out arguments that follow a necessary logic, as 
they  are  in  accordance  with  established  scientific  discourse  on  economic  policy.  This 
resonates with the hegemonic position of neoliberal economic regulation and the primacy of 
the global scale of economic organization (Brenner, 2004; Peck and Tickell, 2002). Schmidt 
(2002) also asserts that normative arguments of appropriateness constitute political strategy. 
These  arguments  are  spatially–temporally  contingent  and  may  be  counter-hegemonic  to 
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established  scientific  discourses.  In  SRA  terms,  the  balance  between  these  forms  of 
legitimization is important for understanding the balance of forces in a particular policy area. 
 
3. The politics of Norwegian resource-based industrialization 
The  role  of  the  state  and  the  trade  unions  in  supporting  the  build  up  of  key  Norwegian 
industries constitutes an important backdrop to our case study. Historically, state involvement 
preceded trade union involvement. Following the introduction of parliamentary democracy in 
1884 and independence in 1905, the social liberal party Venstre continued and expanded an 
interventionist tradition established by Norwegian technocrats under Swedish rule (Slagstad, 
1998). Mounting foreign investment in natural resources provoked a series of concession laws 
between 1906 and 1917 that secured government control over forests, mines and abundant 
hydropower resources as well as privileges for national industrialists and technology transfer 
requirements (Wicken, 2009a). This is crucial for understanding the later politics of Norway’s 
resource-based industrialization. 
This “resource nationalism” continued into the postwar period when centralized trade 
unions  backed  the  Labor  government  in  supporting  the  construction  of  electrochemical 
industries linked to public hydropower installations along the coast (Mjøset, 1986; Wicken, 
2009b).  The  interventionist  legacy  also  shaped  petroleum  resource  management  after  the 
discovery  of  the  North  Sea  fields  from  1969,  with  concession  agreements  for  foreign 
companies  securing  government  revenues  as  well  as  R&D  investments  and  technology 
transfers.  Infant  supply  and  service  industries  were  protected  from  foreign  competition 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Engen, 2009). 
Similar logics also characterized the limited use of natural gas. Industrial organizations 
advocated the landfall of gas for domestic refining and industrial processing from the mid-
1970s  despite  the  lack  of  a  market.  This  process  followed  the  classical  trajectory  of   12 
Norwegian resource-based industrialization, with explicit references to the “natural resources 
curse” (Auty, 1995). As a result, the state contributed to the establishment of the Norwegian 
petrochemical  industry  in  the  manufacturing  region  of  Grenland  during  the  1970s  in  an 
attempt to spur the use of natural gas feedstock domestically (Berrefjord, 1982). 
As for the electrochemical and the petroleum extraction industries, natural-gas-based 
manufacturing was supported by R&D programs carried out by research institutes as well as 
in-house R&D in Statoil and Hydro within a framework of state-led creation of new industries 
( Wicken, 2009a). Top executives within the Labor Party and the Norwegian Confederation of 
Trade  Unions  (LO)  were  the  main  drivers  of  these  innovation  policies,  embedded  in  the 
broader framework of Spatial Keynesian (Brenner, 2004) redistributive regional development 
(Slagstad, 1998). 
The  state-driven  industrial  and  innovation  policy  system  rested  on  broader  social 
foundations that offered comparatively strong privileges for labor and the regions, subsumed 
in  Katzenstein’s  (1985,  page  32)  concept  of  “social  corporatism”.  Katzenstein’s  point  of 
departure was the observation that the centralized elite cooperation typical of small, advanced 
European  states  in  the  postwar  period  was  matched  by  an  ideology  of  partnership  and 
bargaining  between  a  multitude  of  interest  groups  in  relatively  open  policy  networks. 
However, while such networked industrial policy routines were common for all these small 
states and categorized broadly as “democratic corporatism”, Katzenstein (1985, page 105) 
noted a distinct “social corporatism” variety in Scandinavia and Austria diverging from more 
business-dominated  models  by  virtue  of  the  strength  of  organized  workers  and  a 
corresponding tendency to politicize investment and employment issues. Given the strength of 
industrial  unions  and  Labor’s  alliances  with  regions  endowed  with  natural  resources 
(Sejersted, 2005, Mjøset 1986, Lipset & Rokkan, 1967), industrial and innovation policies 
focused  on  using  oil  and  gas  resources  as  tools  for  achieving  industrial  employment and   13 
balanced  regional  development  can  be  seen  as  major  examples  of  social  corporatism  in 
Norway.. 
These  characteristics  were  challenged  from  the  early  1990s.  Reflecting  a  shift  of 
regulatory ideas away from interventionism (Østerud & Selle, 2006) as well as European 
Economic Area restrictions, the Norwegian state reduced its use of the companies Statoil and 
Hydro as regional and industrial development vehicles, compounding competitive pressures 
on many coastal regions (Baldersheim and Fimreite, 2005; Engen and Ryggvik, 2005; Lie, 
2005).  The  companies  themselves—with  substantial  remaining  state  shareholdings—were 
increasingly  allowed  to  adopt  strategies  driven  by  shareholder  value  and  global  portfolio 
considerations. This restructuring and rescaling of company strategies was embraced by the 
powerful Ministry of Oil and Energy, and perceived as being supported by public policies, 
R&D policies included, from the 1990s (interview with former Minister of Trade and Industry 
Odd  Eriksen,  2007;  Wicken,  2009a).  Below,  we  argue  that  instead  of  replacing  social 
corporatism as a strategically selective context for innovation policy, these competition state 
tendencies  met  strong  resistance.  Actors  associated  with  the  logic  of  social  corporatism 
mobilized  in  favor  of  innovation  strategies,  reinforcing  the  traditional  focus  on  domestic 
industrial employment and regional development, although with a distinct “Schumpeterian 
flavor”. 
 
4. Labor agency and regional consolidation through a national innovation program 
The national research program Gassmaks for the domestic industrial utilization of natural gas 
feedstock was presented by the Research Council of Norway (RCN) in August 2006 (RCN, 
2006). The report recommended a research program with an 8–10-year life span, with public 
funding to basic and applied R&D in firms and research institutions of NOK 1.1 billion. This 
makes Gassmaks one of the largest Norwegian publicly funded research programs to date. An   14 
initial NOK 26 million was granted in 2007 (MoF, 2006; RCN, 2007). Program priorities 
included  research  on  petrochemical  products  and  processes,  gas-to-energy  processes  and 
fuels, the conversion of gas feedstock to materials, and finally, gas as a feedstock to the 
production of bioproteins. 
 
Gassmaks as a strategic network 
We argue that three core interest organizations and one strategic partner (Hay, 1998) proved 
particularly influential in establishing Gassmaks. The core organized interests included the 
Norwegian  Gas  Forum  (NGF),  LO  (dominated  by  the  chemical,  electrochemical  and 
petroleum workers’ union IndustriEnergi) and the enterprise organization Norwegian Industry 
(NI). 
 NGF is an organization comprised of 12 regional networks that promote the use of 
natural gas in their local areas (NGF, 2008). These networks, of which the earliest emerged in 
the late 1980s, were mostly initiated by regional politicians or bureaucrats and exemplify the 
emerging  tendency  of  self-governed  competitive  strategies  (Brenner,  2004).  The  explicit 
focus  on  industrial  utilization  of  natural  gas  feedstock  primarily  came  from  the 
manufacturing-dominated regions of Telemark and Nordland, while other regions were more 
concerned with natural gas for energy purposes in buildings and vehicles. The regions seemed 
to target state investments rather than private capital in their claims for infrastructure. While 
initiatives were scattered and somewhat competing at first, a more coherent strategy was 
chosen by NGF when the regions recognized mutual benefits in several policy areas (Reitan et 
al., 2008). Consistent support for a gas pipeline to the Telemark region (Underthun, 2008) and 
Gassmaks are examples in point. The support for the Gassmaks process means we refer to 
NGF when regional interests are discussed in the remainder of this paper.LO and The Labor 
Party established the Henriksen Committee in 2000 to develop a strategy for domestic use of   15 
natural gas in Norway (interview, LO, 2007). While this was a centralized initiative from LO, 
the regions were consulted when evaluating strategies: “[…] we took a journey along the 
coast to identify the interests and potential of the regions” (interview, Henriksen committee 
member, 2007). This illustrates the intertwined networks at work and a rescaling of union 
strategies (Castree et al., 2004; Tufts, 2008). The resulting report (LO and AP, 2001) gave 
specific recommendations on state responsibilities for gas infrastructure as well as a more 
thorough  strategy  for  utilizing  feedstock  in  manufacturing.  However,  the  transfer  of 
governmental power from the Labor Party to the center-right Bondevik II government in 2001 
put implementation on hold (interview LO, 2007). 
The Henriksen committee was not the only forum through which LO pursued their 
interests.  As  a  part  of  the  Konkraft  cooperation  with  NI,  the  Organization  of  Norwegian 
Shipping  and  the  Organization  of  the  Petroleum  Extraction  Industry,  LO  urged  the  other 
organizations to find ways in which the domestic use of natural gas could be enhanced. This 
work  is  reflected  in  two  reports  (KONKRAFT,  2002;  PIL,  2002).  This  more  traditional 
corporatist and centralized form of agency towards business interests was considered equally 
important by LO members (interview, LO 2007) at the time, thus reflecting the multitude of 
labor union strategies in gas politics.  
While  the  petroleum  extraction  companies  were  moderate  in  their  enthusiasm  for 
domestic utilization in the period that followed, LO had its most important ally in NI, who 
continued  campaigning  for  domestic  utilization  during  the  reign  of  the  Bondevik  II 
government from 2001 to 2005 (interview, NI, 2007). 
Coinciding  with  these  policy  initiatives,  Sintef  and  the  Norwegian  University  of 
Science and Technology (NTNU)—centerpieces of the postwar industrial research system 
described  in  section  three—lobbied  for  a  substantial  R&D  program  on  natural  gas.  The 
research community argued that state-supported R&D in this area had been scarce since the   16 
end of the research program SPUNG in 1993. As strategic partners to the core interest groups 
described above, Sintef and NTNU provided crucial scientific information and lent legitimacy 
to the development of policy ideas. However, the research group did not share all the strategic 
goals of the other interest groups (interview, Sintef 2006). The scaling of activities was one of 
these,  because  building  international  prestige  through  research  cooperation  beyond 
Norwegian borders was emphasized to a greater extent by Sintef/NTNU (interview Sintef, 
2006). 
Thus, cooperation between these strategic organized interests started emerging in the 
2000-2004 period. However, we argue that the decisive strategic networking (Hay, 1998) 
behind the concrete innovation strategy in question took place between 2004 and 2007. 
The  strategic  interaction  between  NGF  and  the  peak  organizations  was 
institutionalized as the Gas Alliance (GA) during the autumn of 2004, with the main aim of 
influencing the parliamentary decision on developing domestic gas infrastructure (Reitan et 
al., 2008). The interaction was strategic in the sense that the different actors were dependent 
on each other’s strengths to gain acceptance for common goals. LO and NI enjoyed strong 
institutional capacities and a long tradition for cooperation, yet they also depended on NGF 
and the regions for parliamentary support, reiterating the importance of the regional scale for 
industrial policy and political representation. This rescaling of political strategy from LO was 
emphasized by the claim that it “[…] was a great advantage to the campaign when we started 
the cooperation with NGF as we mobilized all these regional political muscles” (interview, 
LO, 2007). NGF benefited from the capacity of the peak organizations and the harmonizing 
effect the interaction had on interregional competition (interview, NGF, 2006). NGF thus 
followed LO’s advice on developing common national frames rather than continuing a “[…] 
competitive stalemate of priorities” (interview, NGF, 2006). All the interlocutors viewed the   17 
networking and strategic rescaling of strategies as beneficial when attempting to shift state 
strategic selectivity in the policy area of natural gas management. 
Gassmaks emerged as a reflexive result of this cooperation. In the planning stage, the 
three  core  interest  organizations  contacted  the  research  community  at  Sintef/NTNU.  The 
research  community  proposed  research  areas  in  the  period  that  followed,  and  received 
suggestions  from  other  Norwegian  research  groups  and  firms  through  an  open  hearing. 
Interestingly, some of these firms were seen as promoting a different kind of state selectivity 
in Norwegian natural gas management to the core interest organizations. Yet, they represented 
an important potential for technological upgrading in the domestic refining of gas if the right 
innovation policy platform was established (interviews, LO and NGF, 2008). Ideas from the 
draft in progress were presented at a national gas conference by LO in early 2005 (Hongset, 
2005). 
The  Labor  Party  supported  initiatives  by  the  Gas  Alliance  mostly  because  of  the 
established cooperation with LO and the prominence of Labor Party politicians in NGF (NGF, 
2008).  The  fact  that  the  Labor  Party  became  the  dominant  party  of  the  new  left-center 
government of 2005 helped the Gas Alliance and its work to put in place Gassmaks. The 
inaugural Soria Moria Declaration (TNG, 2005) from the new government included a clear 
focus  on  domestic  gas  utilization.  This  renewed  prominence  of  interventionism  and  the 
centrality of the strategic networks described above was demonstrated when Odd Eriksen, 
chairman of NGF and a leading advocate for Gassmaks, went on to become Minister of Trade 
and Industry for the Labor Party in 2005. 
The  first  draft  of  Gassmaks  was  presented  by  The  Confederation  of  Norwegian 
Enterprise (on behalf of Norwegian Industry), LO and NGF in December 2005 (NHO et al., 
2005) at a meeting with the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Oil and Energy 
and the Ministry of Education. Continuous revision throughout the spring of 2006 took place   18 
under  the  supervision  of  RCN.  In  August  2006,  the  final  version  was  accepted  by  the 
government (RCN, 2006). Since then, a board headed by LO has been established and the first 
rounds of applications and grants have been completed (RCN, 2008). 
Whereas LO and NGF members were enthusiastic about the innovative configuration 
of the strategic network (Interviews, 2006–2008), the representative from Norwegian Industry 
claimed  that  it  was  the  very  tradition  of  cooperation  that  prompted  such  a  successful 
partnership, substantiating our emphasis on the legacy of social corporatism: 
 
“[The  Gas  Alliance]  is  not  really  a  new  phenomenon.  The  employer  side  and  the 
employee side usually agree on industrial policy […] and in 9 of 10 cases we agree 
with  the  regions.  [The]  gas  alliance  manifests  itself  around  the  gas  issue,  but  it 
prolongs the traditional cooperation on Norwegian industrial policy” (interview, NI, 
2007). 
 
While  the  senior  advisor  to  RCN  responsible  for  Gassmaks  agreed  that  labor 
organizations and regional interests have often been consulted in the development of R&D 
programs, he claimed that bottom-up initiatives as seen prior to Gassmaks was unusual. The 
former big program on the utilization of the gas value chain, SPUNG (1987–1994), was, by 
contrast, initiated by the Ministry of Oil and Energy, and most other related programs have 
been similarly steered top-down (interview, RCN, 2007). The LO dominance in the network 
behind the Gassmaks policy process underlines Rutherford and Holmes’ (2005) account of 
labor as a capable strategist for innovation policy, and demonstrates that trade unions can 
enjoy a level of influence on innovation policy processes beyond the symbolic stakeholding 
warned against by Jessop and Sum (2006). Moreover, it illustrates the empowerment that is 
possible  through  reflexive  and  somewhat  “Schumpeterian”  unionism  union  (Tufts,  2008).   19 
Likewise, the networks at the regional level demonstrated how structurally oriented action, 
drawing upon actors associated with social corporatism, amplified their voice in attempting to 
attract state and private capital. 
 
The strategic formulation of Gassmaks 
We now turn to the strategic formulation through which the political process was mediated. 
The way in which the policy process was mediated should be seen as just as important as the 
network it was mediated through and from. Our analysis of strategic formulation follows Hay 
(1998), but bears in mind the distinction between a necessary logic of arguments on the one 
hand  and  the  normative  appropriateness  of  arguments  on  the  other  (Schmidt,  2002).  The 
Gassmaks campaign followed a complex necessary logic of flexible economic restructuring, 
environmental considerations and natural gas price convergence on the one hand, while on the 
other hand utilizing the normative logic on resource management, value enhancement and 
employment, more inspired by the legacy of social corporatism. 
 
Strategic formulation 1: the necessary logic of Gassmaks 
The  argumentation  of  Gassmaks  was  well  adjusted  to  the  “Schumpeterian”  language  of 
innovation and flexibility throughout the policy process (Hongset, 2005, 2008; RCN, 2006). 
The  flexibility  aspect  was  primarily  related  to  the  chemical  and  biological  tailoring  of 
products (RCN, 2006). Such innovative capacity was highlighted as a factor that would make 
Norwegian activities robust and would therefore reduce the risk of relocalization (interview, 
LO, 2007). However, the idea of competitiveness was also coupled to how Gassmaks could 
foster  knowledge  transfers  systems,  thus  echoing  the  innovation  systems  literature  (e.g. 
Lundvall,  2002):  “[…]  the  likelihood  of  cooperation  between  researchers  and  visionary 
entrepreneurs is fairly high” (Interview, Sintef, 2006). Addressing the need for personnel to   20 
make knowledge transfers possible also legitimized a focus on basic research in universities. 
References to past success stories in higher education were engaged in this respect: “[…] 
from SPUNG, we graduated 50 doctoral candidates, and they now hold leading positions in 
various Norwegian firms” (interview, Sintef, 2006). Finally, localized synergies in terms of 
knowledge  spillover  and  shared  costs  were  highlighted  as  extra  benefits  from  Gassmaks 
projects (Hongset, 2008).  
Competitiveness arguments also involved references to clean technology. In addition 
to  substituting  more  polluting  fossil  fuels  as  reduction  materials  in  the  electrochemical 
industry  (RCN,  2006),  clean  technology  arguments  envisaged  Gassmaks’  contributions  to 
advances in solar power technologies. For instance, carbon black is pure carbon that may be 
extracted from natural gas and used as a raw material for producing solar wafers (Carbontech, 
2007). 
The price of feedstock received much focus in the first implementation phase. Since 
volume remains important for innovations in petrochemical production, global pricing trends 
are crucial. Van Camp (2005) explains the geographical production shift from Europe and 
North America to the Middle East over the last two decades by the great price disparity that 
has developed because of the lack of alternative gas markets near the Middle East petroleum 
fields. However, as natural gas has become more mobile because of methods of liquefaction 
and regasification, some analysts predict a global convergence of prices (Bridge, 2004). This 
debate became an important window of opportunity for the Gas Alliance. If prices converge, 
it was argued that distance decay would regain its importance, as even a small difference in 
transport  costs  will  be  a  substantial  incentive  to  utilize  the  feedstock  locally.  Since  the 
Norwegian mainland is close to the continental shelf’s gas resources, the argument was that 
Norway represents a competitive location for gas-based manufacturing. Although present in 
the Gassmaks report (RCN, 2006), this legitimization of the R&D program was primarily   21 
elaborated  after  program  implementation.  In  2008,  the  consultant  agency  EconPöyry 
published a report (2008) that was commissioned by Gassmaks. The report concluded that if 
prices converge, this would benefit European petrochemical industries. 
The “necessity” of the arguments outlined above reflects how competition state logics 
constitute  a  governmentality  that  permeates  discursive  and  material  practices  and  is  a 
precondition  for  political  strategy.  However,  we  argue  that  while  these  parameters  may 
promote  the  desires  of  business  (Geddes,  2006),  the  complexity  of  spatio–temporal 
contingency (Schmidt, 2002; Jessop, 2007) adds a normative framing of arguments that opens 
up the balance of forces, empowering the strategic network in question in this paper.. 
 
Strategic formulation 2: The normative framing of Gassmaks 
The  normative  framing  of  legitimacy  is  typically  more  contingent  (Schmidt,  2002).  This 
echoes Hay’s (1998) understanding of political action as being about absorbing particular 
understandings and arguments that exist as resources within a given state space. The path 
dependence  of  social  corporatism  represents  a  vital  strategically  selective  context  in  this 
respect.  Whereas  former  regional  campaigns  for  infrastructure  explicitly  emphasized  the 
state’s investment responsibilities (Underthun, 2008), the strategic formulation of Gassmaks 
took a more subtle approach. The notion of rights to natural resources reflects the heritage of 
infant  industry  development  that  had  dominated  Norwegian  natural  resource  management 
since the concession laws (Engen, 2009). Different from the surge in resource nationalism in 
Latin America (Perreault, 2006), there are parallels in terms of questioning who has the power 
to  manage  a  natural  resource.  Rather,  Gassmaks  expresses  a  sophisticated  resource 
nationalism that questions how the value chain of natural gas is scaled and suggest strategies 
and arguments for why and how the resource should be re-embedded in Norwegian space to 
realize value enhancement (RCN, 2006). Gas exports considered as a “leakage” (interviews,   22 
NGF, LO and PIL, 2006-08) is a metaphor for this problem. The metaphors of leakage and 
rights even find arguments in the resource curse hypothesis, a recurring theme in Norwegian 
natural gas management (Auty, 1995; Bridge, 2008). In its crude essence, this perspective 
suggests  that  a  rich  resource  base  may  work  counterproductively  because  a  large  but 
exhaustible  resource  extraction  sector  produces  disinvestment,  labor  shortage  and 
vulnerability  in  the  manufacturing  sector.  These  grim  prospects  are  well  reflected  in  the 
Gassmaks strategic formulation: “[…] we have to find a way to use the resources in a more 
diverse  and  stimulating  way”  (interview,  LO,  2008).  The  resource  curse  argument  was 
deployed  actively  in  strategic  formulation,  criticizing  the  strategic  context  of  shareholder 
value that “dictates” the national champions: “[…] strategic dominance of petroleum export in 
Norway  is  negative  in  the  long  run.  The  companies  [Statoil  and  Hydro]  are  primarily 
concerned about short-term earnings from their global markets” (interview, NGF, 2007)”. 
Normative strategic formulation in the Gassmaks process also specified what types of 
gas utilization should be excluded, namely the technology of liquefying natural gas (LNG) for 
long distance transport. Admittedly, this is a technology that has enabled some of the price 
convergence discussed as an advantage to Gassmaks (EconPöyry, 2008). LNG research was 
discussed as an area of research within the program as major firm Statoil and the research 
community Sintef/NTNU took a great interest in this, not least because of their expertise in 
the field (interview, Sintef 2006). A similar interest was expressed by the large corporations 
Hydro and Statoil, not least because LNG was not part of any large research program to date. 
It is likely that LNG would have dominated the program if the policy process had been more 
business–university driven (interview, Sintef, 2006). However, because of the union-inclusive 
character of the policy process and the distinctly domestic scaling of activities, LNG was 
excluded.  There  were  clear  reasons  for  this.  Even  though  LNG  technology  enhances  the 
geographical and by that the commercial reach of natural gas (Bridge, 2004), LO claimed that   23 
“[…] it is merely a transport technology” (interview, LO, 2007). More importantly, LO did 
not believe that LNG could guarantee employment and domestic manufacturing, reflecting the 
normative basis for the Gassmaks strategy and the context of social corporatism. NI agreed: 
”[…] the main reason [against LNG research] is that there is enough already [in-house]. LNG 
does  not  guarantee  activities  beyond  technology  development  […]  we  wanted  a 
manufacturing  focus.”  (interview,  NI,  2007,  our  emphasis).  The  argument  here  was  that 
capital-intensive  LNG  research  would  not  influence  manufacturing  and  would  primarily 
benefit the large corporations whose value chains go beyond Norwegian space. To LO and 
NGF in particular, this could deepen the uneven and monopolistic nature of innovation policy 
in an economy dominated by a few national champions. In the aftermath of this discussion, 
LNG  was  included  into  the  considerably  larger  and  more  general  research  program  on 
developing Norway’s petroleum assets, Petromaks (RCN, 2009).   
 
5. Concluding discussion 
In an attempt to complement the literature on innovation policy, this paper has addressed the 
political dynamics of innovation policy through a Norwegian case study about the formation 
of a national research program for utilizing natural gas resources. The paper stressed that a 
business-and  competition  state-oriented  strategically  selective  context  was  challenged  by 
policy routines and normative underpinnings associated with social corporatism. 
Three main traits of the alternative context for political action can be considered as 
crucial  for  political  pervasiveness  throughout  the  Gassmaks  policy  process.  First,  the 
partnership between industrial organizations and the regions built on the legacy of pre-1990s 
forms of cooperation. This helped the development of trust between the main drivers of the 
process. Second, the culture of bargaining with interest groups outside the peak organizations 
facilitated the involvement of research communities and regional interests. Third, a legacy of   24 
politicizing investment and employment issues on the basis of spatial and social equality 
norms facilitated consensus within the Gas Alliance network and helped to legitimize the 
program in the Norwegian political setting. In spite of being situated in a national strategically 
selective  context  that  seemed  to  favor  petroleum  extraction  and  export  dominated  by  the 
globally  oriented  oil  companies  at  the  expense  of  downstream  utilization  in  Norway,  the 
legacy  described  above  aided  the  inclusion  of  trade  union  representatives  and  regional 
interests as main advocates for the research program. However, the paper also stressed that 
the  actors  that  drove  the  political  process  were  compelled  to  confront  the  strategically 
selective context of the competition state in a number of ways, in this way demonstrating the 
dialectic of structure and agency within a strategic–relational approach as suggested by Hay 
(1998; 2002) and Jessop (Jessop, 2001). 
The Gassmaks innovation initiative can be criticized for the narrowness of its social 
base  and  focus.  The  emphasis  on  (predominantly  male)  manufacturing  employment  may 
imply an exclusion of the broader population of labor, such as within the expanding services 
industries. There is also a danger of political lock-in that eliminates alternative development 
paths of innovation (Blake and Hanson, 2005; Grabher, 1993; Narula, 2002). Nevertheless, it 
is difficult to frame Gassmaks as a mere reproduction of blue-collar, heavy manufacturing in 
Norway. The emphasis on SME development as well as on jobs for scientists contrasts with 
the current characteristics of Norwegian resource-based industries (Narula, 2002). 
Although we have argued that trade union involvement in the networks guiding the 
Gassmaks process went well beyond mere symbolic stakeholding (Jessop and Sum, 2006), 
there are also questions related to the strong focus on competitiveness in the program itself. 
Substantive involvement of trade unions may be of limited importance if the norms that guide 
organizations and policy processes have themselves changed towards a competition-oriented 
logic. However, in our view, the emphasis on competitiveness in the Gassmaks documents   25 
does  not  imply  any  significant  departure  from  the  logic  of  social  corporatism  in  which 
national adaptation to international competitiveness imperatives was always a key element. 
The postwar R&D agencies created by top Labor politicians in association with LO were 
indeed  seen  as  major  tools  for  such  adaptation  (Slagstad,  1998).  Thus,  the  references  to 
competitiveness in Gassmaks can be interpreted as a rejuvenation of distinct innovation policy 
features  of  the  Norwegian  variety  of  social  corporatism,  rather  than  a  change  towards 
competition state logic of the kind described by Jessop (2002). 
While it is early to say much about the success of Gassmaks, there are aspects that 
have not turned out according to intensions. First, the government annual budgets have not 
allocated funding that matches the ambitions of the Gassmaks document. This is very much a 
source of concern for the Gassmaks board (Interview, 2009). Second, the domestic scaling of 
activities seems frail. In June 2007, the British chemical company Ineos acquired almost all 
Norwegian petrochemical assets and decided to shut down one of the major production plants 
in May 2008 (Plastforum, 2008). Although Ineos’ role in Gassmaks is yet to be assessed, it is 
clear that any project embarked upon by the company will be a part of their overall global 
strategy and not confined to the Norwegian national scale. Moreover, applications for grants 
from domestic SMEs were scarce in the initial grant period compared with the expectations of 
members of the Gas Alliance, although the Gassmaks board now claims that there has been an 
increasing  interest  from  smaller  companies.  In  2007  however,  the  big  firms  (Statoil  and 
Hydro) and Sintef/NTNU received the bulk of funding (RCN, 2007). These remarks echo 
some  of  the  criticism of  both  national  and  regional  innovation  systems  in  the  innovation 
policy literature (Bunnell and Coe, 2001; Grande, 2001; Kuhlmann, 2001), as it seems hard to 
guarantee  that  economic  activities  are  kept  within  the  socially  constructed  boundaries  as 
Gassmaks would require.    26 
In a comparative perspective, the explicit focus on spatial equality and the inclusion of 
trade unions in the Gassmaks process may be seen as typical for the Nordic setting. Here, 
unions and regional interests still enjoy influence in policy processes focused on spurring 
innovation and competitiveness at various levels (Benner, 2003; Koch, 2005; Lundvall, 2002). 
A look at the organizations guiding Norwegian innovation polices may indicate that these 
offer particular state selectivities favoring such actors. Fagerberg (2009) and Benner (2003) 
note the lack of “modernization” of the organizations responsible for innovation policies in 
Norway compared with its Nordic neighbors and other advanced OECD states. Norway’s 
innovation policy system is still essentially a redressing of traditional regional development 
agencies  in  combination  with  a  relatively  subordinated  research  council.  Few  “buffers” 
between  political  mobilization  and  innovation  policies  seems  to  have  been  a  strategic 
advantage for the groups promoting Gassmaks. The political legitimization of organizational 
conservatism in the innovation policy area also bolsters the impression of a retention of  the 
strategic selectivity of social corporatism. The Minister of Trade and Industry in the newly 
reelected “red–green” government recently legitimized the lack of changes in the innovation 
policy apparatus by referring to the importance of other institutional features associated with 
Norwegian (and Nordic) social corporatism, such as wage equality, strong welfare policies, 
trust and worker influence for innovation performance. Thus, in the Norwegian case, the new 
discourse on the pro-innovation aspects of Nordic welfare regimes (Castells and Himanen, 
2002), worker influence (Lundvall, 2002) and equality (Esping-Andersen, 2002) seems to 
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